In mechanism design, a strategyproof (SP) mechanism is a game form in which each player has a weakly-dominant strategy, so that no player can gain by...

tie-breaking rule, it might become non-strategyproof. Cardinality-strategyproofness and inclusion-strategyproofness are satisfied by utilitarian approval...

condition "sharing incentive"). Strategyproofness: a user cannot get a larger allocation by lying about his needs. Strategyproofness is important, as evidence...

Again, one can define DD-strategyproofness, BD-strategyproofness, SD-strategyproofness and PC-strategyproofness. Participation - abstaining from participation...

two outcomes a voter prefers, not how much. This can be replaced by strategyproofness, i.e. every person's dominant strategy is to honestly disclose their...

otherwise-favorable result. The criterion can also be described as a weaker form of strategyproofness: while it is impossible for honesty to always be the perfect strategy...

anonymity, strategyproofness and proportionality among all symmetric single-peaked preferences.: Prop.1  UPM is the only rule satisfying strategyproofness and...

the standard notion of strategyproofness, as Allan Gibbard has shown that only random dictatorships can satisfy strategyproofness and ex post efficiency...

Monotonicity (mechanism design) Preference revelation[disambiguation needed] Strategyproofness Vazirani, Vijay V.; Nisan, Noam; Roughgarden, Tim; Tardos, Éva (2007)...

anonymous and strategyproof for all single-peaked preferences if it is equivalent to a median rule with at most n+1 phantoms. A rule is strategyproof for all...

{\displaystyle i} and some valuation vector v − i {\displaystyle v_{-i}} . Strategyproofness means that an agent with real valuation v i {\displaystyle v_{i}}...

lottery does not discriminate in advance between different voters. Strategyproofness: any false report by an agent results in an outcome that is weakly...

preferences (where the median rule is strategyproof) and dichotomous preferences (where approval or score voting are strategyproof). With large electoral districts...

rule satisfying non-imposition (every alternative can be chosen) and strategyproofness when there are more than two candidates is the dictatorship mechanism...

characterization of domain restrictions admitting a nondictatorial and strategyproof social welfare function. These correspond to preferences for which there...

routing problems, this mechanism is not only strategyproof, but also the minimum among all strategyproof mechanisms. In the case of network flows, unicast...

best defends her opinions. We then say that approval voting is not strategyproof: once the voter has identified her own preferences, she does not have...

preferences. For a voter with dichotomous preferences, approval is strategyproof. When all voters have dichotomous preferences and vote the sincere,...

independence of irrelevant alternatives. Gibbard's theorem shows that any strategyproof game form (i.e. one with a dominant strategy) with more than two outcomes...

tied vote, assuming some selected voter has expressed a preference. Strategyproofness: there is never any advantage to tactical voting. Failed criteria...

019. ISSN 0377-2217. Peters, Dominik (2021). "Proportionality and Strategyproofness in Multiwinner Elections". arXiv:2104.08594 [cs.GT]. Brandl, Florian;...

S a higher utility. Core-FS implies Group-FS. Several variants of strategyproofness (SP) have been studied for voting rules: Individual-SP means that...

there is no PB rule that satisfies the following three properties: strategyproofness, efficiency, and positivity (- at least one approved project of each...

preference aggregation. Chpora, Ghose and Meyer relate belief-merging to strategyproofness. They show that the Arrow's impossibility theorem and Gibbard–Satterthwaite...

benefit from redistributing its ui among its members (this is a kind of strategyproofness axiom). Additivity - for each agent i, the allocation to i is a linear...

accepted distribution c*. They define a new concept called level-strategyproofness (Level-SP), which is relevant when society's decision is based on...

true valuations. They are not strategyproof - a partner can gain by reporting false valuations. Indeed, strategyproofness is incompatible with envy-freeness:...

mistakes. An additional requirement is that the fair division procedure be strategyproof, i.e. it should be a dominant strategy for the participants to report...

that extends RD (which includes RSD) satisfies both efficiency and strategyproofness. The page on fair random assignment compares RSD to other procedures...

example, envy-freeness (EF) - no agent should envy another agent. Strategyproofness (SP) - each agent has an incentive to report his/her true preferences...