Coercion (international relations)

In international relations, coercion refers to the imposition of costs by a state on other states and non-state actors to prevent them from taking an action (deterrence) or to compel them to take an action (compellence).[1][2][3] Coercion frequently takes the form of threats or the use of limited military force.[4] It is commonly seen as analytically distinct from persuasion (which may not necessarily involve the imposition of costs), brute force (which may not be intended to shape the adversary's behavior), or full-on war (which involves the use of full military force).[1][5][3]

Coercion takes the form of either deterrence or compellence. Compellence has been characterized as harder to successfully implement than deterrence because of difficulties in getting actors to withdraw actions.[3][2] One influential typology of coercion distinguishes between strategies to punish an adversary, raise the risk for an adversary, or deny the adversary from achieving their objectives.[3][2] Successful instances of coercive diplomacy in one case may have a deterrent effect on other states,[6][7][3] whereas a reputation for a lack of resolve may undermine general deterrence[8] and future compellence.[9]

Successful coercive diplomacy entails clearly communicated threats, a cost-benefit calculus, credibility, and reassurance.[10] It frequently revolves around a demonstration of capabilities and resolve, both of which enhance the credibility of attempts to coerce others. Scholars have identified several factors as contributing to successful coercion, such as power, interests,[11] reputation,[8][9] credibility, resolve, and ability to signal.[12]

Definition

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Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman define coercion as "getting the adversary to act a certain way via anything short of brute force; the adversary must still have the capacity of organized violence but choose not to exercise it". Coercion strategy "relies on the threat of future military force to influence an adversary's decision making but may also include limited uses of actual force".[4]

Robert Pape uses the term coercion as a synonym for compellence.[2]

Coercion

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Thomas Schelling and Robert Pape distinguished between coercive strategies that sought to:

  1. Punish: Raise the costs for the adversary
  2. Risk: Raise the probability of future costs for the adversary
  3. Deny: Prevent the adversary from obtaining their objectives.[3][2]

Pape also added the strategy of decapitation, which typically entails targeting leaders.[2] Alexander Downes and Kathryn McNabb Cochran distinguish between two punishment strategies: (i) Coercive victimization (which raises the costs of war for a government by targeting its civilians) and (ii) Eliminationist victimization (which removes civilians from territory).[13]

According to Richard Ned Lebow, successful coercion tends to involve:[14]

  1. A formulated commitment
  2. A communication of that commitment to the other side
  3. The capability to back up the commitment
  4. The will to back up the commitment

According to Robert Art, the perquisites for coercion success are:[15]

  1. Clear objectives
  2. Strong motivation
  3. Domestic and international support
  4. Strong leadership
  5. Clearly stated demands
  6. Creation of a sense of urgency in the other state's mind
  7. Making the target fear unacceptable escalation
  8. Asymmetry in motivation

Deterrence

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Main article: Deterrence theory

Deterrence is widely defined as any use of threats (implicit or explicit) or limited force intended to dissuade an actor from taking an action (i.e. maintain the status quo).[16][17]

Most of the innovative work on deterrence theory occurred from the late 1940s to mid-1960s.[18] Historically, scholarship on deterrence has tended to focus on nuclear deterrence. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an extension of deterrence scholarship to areas that are not specifically about nuclear weapons.[17]

Compellence

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Main article: Compellence

Compellence is the attempt to get an actor to change its behavior through threats to use of force or the actual use of limited force. As distinguished from deterrence theory, which is a strategy aimed at maintaining the status quo (dissuading adversaries from undertaking an action), compellence entails efforts to change the status quo (persuading an opponent to change their behavior).

Credibility

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Main article: Credibility (international relations)

Credibility in international relations refers to the perceived likelihood that a leader or a state follows through on threats and promises that have been made.[19] Credibility is a key component of coercive diplomacy and deterrence, as well as the functioning of military alliances. Credibility is related to concepts such as reputation (how past behavior shapes perceptions of an actor's tendencies) and resolve (the willingness to stand firm while incurring costs).

Credibility may be determined through assessments of past reputation,[8][9][20] current interests,[11] and signaling.[12] Misperception and miscommunication can lead to erroneous assessments of credibility.[21] Assessments of reputation may be linked to specific leaders,[22][23] as well as states. Some scholars question whether credibility or reputation matters in international disputes.[11][24]

Credibility entails that defiance will be met with punishment, and that compliance will be met with restraint.[25] One of the main problems in coercive diplomacy is that it is hard to credibly signal that compliance will not lead to punishment.[25][26][27][28] If the coerced state perceives that it will be punished regardless of whether it complies or not, then that might increase the likelihood of non-compliance.[25][26][27][28]

Some scholarship suggests that the credibility of threats is enhanced by costly signaling, which means that the threats themselves incur costs, which signify that the threats are genuine.[29] Other scholars argue that sunk-cost signaling is exceedingly rare in practice, as states prefer to signal credibility and resolve in other ways.[30]

Some scholars argue that incurring audience costs effectively enhance the credibility of threats.[31][32][33] Other scholars dispute that audience costs enhance credibility.[34][35]

References

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  1. ^ a b Greenhill, Kelly M.; Krause, Peter (2018). Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-084633-6.
  2. ^ a b c d e f Pape, Robert A. (1996). Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (1 ed.). Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-3134-0. JSTOR 10.7591/j.ctt1287f6v.
  3. ^ a b c d e f Schelling, Thomas C. (1966). Arms and Influence. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-00221-8. JSTOR j.ctt5vm52s.
  4. ^ a b Byman, Daniel and Matthew Waxman. The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might New York. Cambridge University Press. 2002.
  5. ^ Morgan, Patrick M. (1977). Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis. SAGE Publications. pp. 26–30. ISBN 978-0-8039-0819-2.
  6. ^ Zhang, Ketian (2019). "Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing's Use of Coercion in the South China Sea". International Security. 44 (1): 117–159. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00354. ISSN 0162-2889. S2CID 198952376.
  7. ^ Miller, Nicholas L. (2014). "The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions". International Organization. 68 (4): 913–944. doi:10.1017/S0020818314000216. ISSN 0020-8183. S2CID 154519741.
  8. ^ a b c Weisiger, Alex; Yarhi-Milo, Keren (2015). "Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics". International Organization. 69 (2): 473–495. doi:10.1017/S0020818314000393. ISSN 0020-8183.
  9. ^ a b c Peterson, Timothy M. (2013). "Sending a Message: The Reputation Effect of US Sanction Threat Behavior". International Studies Quarterly. 57 (4): 672–682. doi:10.1111/isqu.12017. ISSN 0020-8833.
  10. ^ Borghard, Erica D.; Lonergan, Shawn W. (2017). "The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace". Security Studies. 26 (3): 452–481. doi:10.1080/09636412.2017.1306396. ISSN 0963-6412. S2CID 46356854.
  11. ^ a b c Press, Daryl G. (2007). Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-7415-6.
  12. ^ a b Fearon, James D. (1997). "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 41 (1): 68–90. doi:10.1177/0022002797041001004. ISSN 0022-0027. S2CID 42473249.
  13. ^ Alexander B. Downes and Kathryn McNabb Cochran, "It’s a Crime, but Is It a Blunder? Investigating the Military Effectiveness of Civilian Victimization," in Civilians and Warfare in History, ed. Nicola Foote and Nadya Williams (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 288-312.
  14. ^ Lebow, Richard Ned (1981). Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis. Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 978-0-8018-2311-4.
  15. ^ Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC.
  16. ^ Morgan, Patrick M. (1977). Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis. SAGE Publications. pp. 26–30. ISBN 978-0-8039-0819-2.
  17. ^ a b Gartzke, Eric; Lindsay, Jon R. (2019). Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780190908645.001.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-090960-4.
  18. ^ Art, Robert J.; Greenhill, Kelly M. (2015). The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. p. 3. ISBN 978-1-4422-3306-5.
  19. ^ Jervis, Robert; Yarhi-Milo, Keren; Casler, Don (2021). "Redefining the Debate Over Reputation and Credibility in International Security: Promises and Limits of New Scholarship". World Politics. 73 (1): 167–203. doi:10.1017/S0043887120000246. ISSN 0043-8871. S2CID 230529327.
  20. ^ Reiter, Dan (1996). Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-3188-3.
  21. ^ Jervis, Robert (2017). Perception and Misperception in International Politics (new ed.). Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-1-4008-8511-4.
  22. ^ Renshon, Jonathan; Dafoe, Allan; Huth, Paul (2018). "Leader Influence and Reputation Formation in World Politics". American Journal of Political Science. 62 (2): 325–339. doi:10.1111/ajps.12335. ISSN 1540-5907. S2CID 158373803.
  23. ^ Lupton, Danielle L. (2020). Reputation for Resolve: How Leaders Signal Determination in International Politics. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-1-5017-4773-1.
  24. ^ Mercer, Jonathan (2010). Reputation and International Politics. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-7489-7.
  25. ^ a b c Cebul, Matthew D.; Dafoe, Allan; Monteiro, Nuno P. (2020). "Coercion and the Credibility of Assurances". The Journal of Politics. 83 (3): 975–991. doi:10.1086/711132. ISSN 0022-3816. S2CID 225429435.
  26. ^ a b Bowen, Wyn; Knopf, Jeffrey W.; Moran, Matthew (2020). "The Obama Administration and Syrian Chemical Weapons: Deterrence, Compellence, and the Limits of the "Resolve plus Bombs" Formula". Security Studies. 29 (5): 797–831. doi:10.1080/09636412.2020.1859130. ISSN 0963-6412.
  27. ^ a b Sechser, Todd S. (2010). "Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power". International Organization. 64 (4): 627–660. doi:10.1017/S0020818310000214. ISSN 0020-8183. JSTOR 40930451. S2CID 46107608.
  28. ^ a b Pauly, Reid B. C. (2024). "Damned If They Do, Damned If They Don't: The Assurance Dilemma in International Coercion". International Security. 49 (1): 91–132. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00488. ISSN 0162-2889.
  29. ^ Gartzke, Erik A.; Carcelli, Shannon; Gannon, J. Andres; Zhang, Jiakun Jack (2017). "Signaling in Foreign Policy". Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.481. ISBN 978-0-19-022863-7. Archived from the original on 2018-11-28.
  30. ^ Altman, Dan; Quek, Kai (2024). "Do States Really Sink Costs to Signal Resolve?". Journal of Global Security Studies.
  31. ^ Fearon, James D. (1994). "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes". The American Political Science Review. 88 (3): 577–592. doi:10.2307/2944796. ISSN 0003-0554. JSTOR 2944796. S2CID 36315471.
  32. ^ Schultz, Kenneth A. (2001). Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511491658. ISBN 978-0-521-79227-1.
  33. ^ Gelpi, Christopher F.; Griesdorf, Michael (2001). "Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918–94". American Political Science Review. 95 (3): 633–647. doi:10.1017/S0003055401003148. ISSN 0003-0554. S2CID 146346368.
  34. ^ Downes, Alexander B.; Sechser, Todd S. (2012). "The Illusion of Democratic Credibility". International Organization. 66 (3): 457–489. doi:10.1017/S0020818312000161. ISSN 0020-8183. JSTOR 23279964. S2CID 154325372.
  35. ^ Snyder, Jack; Borghard, Erica D. (2011). "The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound". American Political Science Review. 105 (3): 437–456. doi:10.1017/s000305541100027x. ISSN 0003-0554. S2CID 144584619.
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