Sack of Kiev (1169)
Sack of Kiev | |||||||
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Part of the 1167–1169 Kievan succession crisis[2] | |||||||
![]() Pillaging of Kiev in 1169, miniature from the 15th-century Radziwiłł Chronicle | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Coalition: | |||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Mstislav II of Kiev[1] | Andrey Bogolyubsky[1] Sviatoslav of Chernigov Roman of Smolensk |
The sack of Kiev took place on 8–12 March 1169 when a coalition of 11 princes,[1] assembled by prince Andrey Bogolyubsky of Vladimir-Suzdal, attacked the Kievan Rus' capital city of Kiev (modern Kyiv) during the 1167–1169 Kievan succession crisis.[2][3] The conflict, caused by the death of grand prince Rostislav I of Kiev,[4] was between rival branches of the Monomakhovichi clan: the Iziaslavichi of Volhynia (senior Mstislavichi; in control of Kiev, Novgorod, Volynia and Halych) on the one hand, and the Rostislavichi of Smolensk (junior Mstislavichi), the Yurievichi (controlling Suzdalia and Pereyaslavl), and the Olgovichi of Chernigov on the other.[1] Prince Mstislav II of Kiev sought to defend Kiev against the Rostislavichi–Yurievichi–Olgovichi coalition.[1][5]
Background
[edit]It is unclear how succession in Kievan Rus' worked.[6] According to a widely-held view, the traditional rules of hereditary succession dictated that one could only become grand prince of Kiev if one's father or elder brother had sat on the same throne before oneself, although the precise order is not apparent.[7] If one's father or elder brother(s) died before 'sitting on the throne of Kiev', this would make one izgoi, ineligible to reign.[7] A number of scholars have asserted that there was a clear set of rules known as the rota system; the nature and existence of this rota system has been widely debated, with some claiming that no such formal system of succession existed in Kievan Rus'.[6]
1132–1134 Pereyaslavl succession crisis
[edit]After the 1132 death of the prince Mstislav I of Kiev, son of Vladimir Monomakh, his brother Yaropolk II of Kiev ascended to the throne without incident in accordance with established succession practices, and was recognised by the whole Monomakhovichi family.[8] But a conflict arose amongst the Monomakhovichi over the possession of the Principality of Pereyaslavl, the holder of which was expected to be the successor to the Kievan throne.[8][9] When Yaropolk tried to install his nephew Vsevolod Mstislavich of Novgorod and Pskov as the new prince of Pereyaslavl, his younger brother Yuri Dolgorukiy of Rostov-Suzdal challenged him, and war broke out.[8] The conflict, which ended in a compromise in 1134, permanently divided the Monomakhovichi clan into two branches: the senior branch of Mstislav (in 1138 splitting into the Izyaslavichi of Volhynia and the Rostislavichi of Smolensk)[7] and the junior branch of the Yurievichi of Rostov-Suzdal (later Vladimir-Suzdal).[10]
1139–1142 Kievan succession crisis
[edit]When Yaropolk II died in 1139, he was succeeded by his brother Viacheslav I of Kiev, but not for long: within two weeks, the Olgovichi prince Vsevolod of Chernigov seized the Kievan throne by force of arms, reigning without dynastic legitimacy (since his father had never been grand prince of Kiev) until his death in 1146.[7] The Mstislavichi (Izyaslavichi) refused to accept this state of affairs, and defeated both the Olgovichi and Yurievichi by 1142, with Iziaslav II Mstislavich gaining control over Pereyaslavl (and thus the right to reign in Kiev upon Vsevolod's death in 1146) and his brother Sviatopolk of Pskov gaining control over Novgorod.[11]
1146–1159 Kievan succession crisis
[edit]When Vsevolod II Olgovich of Kiev died in 1146, his brother Igor Olgovich immediately claimed the throne, but the Kievan veche refused to accept him.[12] They supported the Pereyaslavl prince Iziaslav II Mstislavich as the new Grand Prince, who thereafter managed to put his own son Mstislav on the throne of Pereyaslavl, and other Mstislavichi relatives in Volhynia, Smolensk, Turov and Novgorod within a few years.[12] Iziaslav's legitimacy was based on some but not all traditional succession criteria of the rota system.[12] According to the view that Yaroslav the Wise had intended to limit succession to the Kievan to three princes per generation, Iziaslav's accession was legitimate; but the Olgovichi line of 'Vsevolod's brothers and cousins represented the elder generation of the dynasty'.[12] If the Olgovichi of Chernigov accepted Iziaslav's accession, they and their descendants would be excluded from all future Kievan successions, and so they vehemently objected.[12] Uncle Yuri Dolgorukiy (progenitor of the Yurievichi of Suzdalia) also fiercely protested that his claim to Kiev preceded that of his nephew Iziaslav II, and even managed to temporarily drive him out of the capital twice.[12]
Yuri's primary goal was controlling Pereyaslavl to secure the Kievan throne for his descendants.[13] In 1147, a joint Yurievichi–Olgovichi force with Cuman aid commanded by Yuri's son Gleb attacked Pereyaslavl, but Iziaslav and his brother Rostislav of Smolensk came to his son Mstislav's assistance, and successfully defended the crown-princely city.[13] Iziaslav made peace with the Olgovichi of Chernigov, but rejected Yuri's peace proposal in which Yuri would recognise Iziaslav as Grand Prince of Kiev in return for transferring Pereyaslavl Iziaslav's son Mstislav to Yuri's son Gleb.[13]
Yuri also tried to disrupt the Volga trade between Volga Bulgaria and the Iziaslav-allied Novgorod Republic; in response, a 1148 Novgorodian punitive expedition (supported by the Mstislavichi-controlled principalities of Kiev and Smolensk) attacked the Suzdalian town of Yaroslavl on the Volga.[14] In 1149, Novgorod also defeated a Suzdalian band trying to prevent the Republic from collecting tribute in its northern regions.[13] The Mstislavichi continued to reign in Novgorod until 1155, with Yuri keeping up pressure on its vulnerable commercial routes.[13] Meanwhile, Yuri and Gleb attacked Kiev successfully in 1149, driving out Iziaslav, but they soon withdrew, and were unable to conquer the crown principality during the protracted battle for Pereyaslavl.[13] In 1151, Yuri's second attempt to seize the capital utterly failed, and he lost both the Kiev and Pereyaslavl.[13] Iziaslav II and his uncle Viacheslav Vladimirovich co-reigned in Kiev until their deaths in 1154.[13] First, the Olgovichi prince Izyaslav Davydovych of Chernigov briefly seized Kiev in 1154.[13] Only after expelling him did Yuri gain hold of Kiev until he himself died in 1157, putting Gleb in Pereyaslavl, another son in Novgorod in 1155, and other Yurievichi relatives in Turov and their family domain of Suzdalia.[13]
After Yuri's death in 1157, local boyars invited Izyaslav Davydovych back to the Grand Prince table in Kiev.[15] However, his father Davyd Sviatoslavich had never sat on the throne of Kiev, making him izgoi, and he was unable to extend his authority in other Kievan Rus' principalities.[4] The Yurievichi remained in control of Pereyaslavl (Gleb) and Suzdalia (Andrey Bogolyubsky), while Novgorod elected Rostislav of Smolensk's son – a Mstislavichi prince – in 1157.[4] In the next year, 1158, the fully eligible Rostislav easily took the Kievan throne, supported by both the princes of Volhynia and Halych; he reigned until 1167.[4]
1159–1167 interlude
[edit]With the accession of Rostislav of Smolensk as Grand Prince of Kiev, 'the traditional principles of dynastic succession were restored and the feuds between dynastic branches relaxed.'[4] The Mstislavichi and Yurievichi branches of the Monomakhovichi clan jointly dominated Kievan Rus', and cooperated to ensure dynastic stability throughout the reign of Rostislav.[4] The senior Mstislavichi line controlled capital Kiev, Smolensk, Volynia, and Novgorod, while the junior Yurievichi branch reigned in Suzdalia and the crown principality of Pereyaslavl.[4] According to Petro Tolochko, Rostislav's nephew Mstislav Iziaslavich was essentially his co-ruler.[16]
1167–1169 Kievan succession crisis
[edit]![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/a8/Principalities_of_Kievan_Rus%27_%281054-1132%29_en.svg/300px-Principalities_of_Kievan_Rus%27_%281054-1132%29_en.svg.png)
Iziaslavichi Coalition Neutral
After the death of Rostislav in 1167, the princely quarrels resumed.[4] According to his position of family seniority, Volodimer Mstislavich was next in line for the Kievan throne.[17] Nevertheless, the Kievan boyars invited Mstislav Iziaslavich, the prince of Volhynia (Volyn), to reign the grand principality. Therefore, having enlisted the support of Yaroslav Halytsky and mobilized a small squad, Mstislav Iziaslavich easily took over the city.[citation needed] However, by taking the throne, he breached the balance of power agreement between the Mstislavichi and Yurievichi, as well as causing a conflict between the Iziaslavichi of Volhynia (the senior Mstislavichi line) and the Rostislavichi of Smolensk (the junior Mstislavichi line).[1] This divided the dynasty into two opposing camps:[1]
- The Iziaslavichi of Volhynia (senior Mstislavichi; controlling Kiev, Volynia, Halych, and Novgorod); led by Mstislav II Iziaslavich of Volhynia and Kiev.[1]
- The Rostislavichi of Smolensk (junior Mstislavichi), the Yurievichi (controlling Suzdalia and Pereyaslavl), and the Olgovichi of Chernigov; led by Andrey Bogolyubsky of Vladimir-Suzdal and Rostov.[1]
In 1168 grand prince Mstislav Iziaslavich of Kiev headed an anti-Polovtsian expedition, in which as many as thirteen princes took part.[citation needed]
In 1169, Andrey Bogolyubsky gathered a large army, which included Murom, Smolensk, Polotsk, Chernihiv, and Dorogobuzh princes, and marched on Kiev. The onslaught was not successful, but Mstyslav's forces were small, as he sent the troops to help his son in Novgorod just before the attack. On the advice of his wife, who was in Kiev, the Grand Prince fled the city and went to Volyn to gather some help.[citation needed]
The sack
[edit]The two main primary sources about the 1169 Sack of Kiev are the Kievan Chronicle (found in the Hypatian Codex) and the Suzdalian Chronicle (found in the Laurentian Codex).[18] The two accounts agree on the following factual descriptions: a military campaign was undertaken at the order of Andrey Bogolyubsky against the city of Kiev and Mstislav Iziaslavich, whom both apparently recognised as the (lawful?) "Kievan Prince".[19] Both agree that the coalition forces were commanded by Andrey's son Mstislav Andreyevich, that 11 other princes participated in the assault (mentioning some by name), provide similar accounts of some aspects of the battle and how Kiev was taken, how Mstislav Iziaslavich's wife and son were captured, the city was sacked and plundered – specifically the churches and monasteries, where many icons, books chasubles were removed/looted from – and the installation of Gleb of Kiev as the next grand prince, after Mstislav Andreyevich returned to Vladimir on the Klyazma in the northeast.[19]
Where they differ is in the details and in their Tendenz: the author of the Kievan Chronicle provides a very elaborate and detailed account, in which he identifies with the capital, the fate of Kiev's citizens and their suffering.[19] He explains the sack of Kiev according to Christian tradition as a just punishment for unspecified sins the inhabitants had allegedly committed, and lamented it.[19] The writer of the Suzdal'–Vladimirian Chronicle agrees that the city was sacked as a just punishment for its inhabitants' sins, but treats Kiev as an enemy,[19] promoting the Yurievichi (Vladimir-Suzdalian) branch of the Monomakhovichi dynasty instead.[20] While the Kievan account describes the attackers who set the Kyiv Monastery of the Caves on fire as "heathens",[21] the Suzdal'–Vladimirian story calls the Monastery's metropolitan "unlawful" because of a theological disagreement over fasting on holy days, adding "that no one may oppose God's law".[22]
After the long siege, the defenders of the city surrendered on 8 March 1169.[citation needed] Mstislav II Iziaslavich fled, while his wife and son were captured by coalition forces.[2] The victorious coalition plundered the city of Kiev and looted its treasures for three days.[2] Chroniclers who witnessed and recorded the events were shocked, with one chronicler lamenting that even icons, their costly metal mountings (rizas), and books from monasteries and churches were stolen.[2]
After that, Andrey Bogolyubsky put his younger brother Gleb Yurievich, prince of Pereyaslav, on the throne of Kiev.[17]
Aftermath
[edit]In 1170 Bogolyubsky sent troops to Novgorod. The formal reason was the dispute over the "Dvina tribute", which Novgorod received from Finno-Ugric tribes, and which from 1169 started to pay Dvina to Suzdal. On 22 February 1170, a united army of Suzdal, Murom, Polotsk, Pereyaslav and others surrounded the city. However, Novgorod persevered. Then Andrey Bogolyubsky applied an economic blockade against Novgorod, and six months later the people of Novgorod asked for peace and the prince to the throne.[citation needed]
Meanwhile, Mstyslav, having gathered troops in early 1170, went to Kiev. Gleb Yuriyovych, unable to defend himself and lacking the support of the local population, went to Pereyaslav and asked for the Polovtsians' help, while his opponent entered the city. However, Mstyslav's stay in Kiev turned out to be short.[citation needed] Once again, having left the Grand Prince table to get new troops in Volhynia,[citation needed] Mstyslav fell ill and died on 19 August 1170.[23] His work was continued by cousins – princes Rostislavichi.[citation needed] The new grand prince Gleb of Kiev also died, probably in the year 1171, albeit under somewhat mysterious circumstances.[23] A rapid succession of briefly reigning princes in the capital eventually saw one Rurik Rostislavich seizing the crown.[23]
Trying to regain control of Kiev, Andrey Bogolyubsky sent another large coalition army (50,000 soldiers according to the Kievan Chronicle, but historians think this is exaggerated[24]), combining the forces of 20 princes.[23] The coalition besieged Siege of Vyshgorod in late 1173, but without success. On the night of 19 December 1173, near Vyshhorod, this army was completely defeated by a younger generation of Volynian–Smolensk princes[23] under the command of Mstyslav Rostyslavych and the Lutsk prince Yaroslav Izyaslavych, who then became the Grand Prince of Kiev.[25][23]
Andrey's attempts to increase his princely authority at the expense of the positions of boyars, bishops, city officials and the veche led to internal strife.[26] As a result, on 28 June 1174, conspirators killed Andrey in his residential town of Bogolyubovo in Suzdalia.[26] His death triggered a Suzdalian war of succession; after several years of struggle (1174–1177), Andrey's brother Vsevolod the Big Nest ascended the throne of Vladimir-Suzdal.[23] Meanwhile, Novgorod threw the Yurievichi out of the Republic after Andrey's assassination, and wouldn't be under their firm control again until 1187.[23]
For one hundred years since the death of Vsevolod II 1146 in Kiev there were: 47 reigns, 24 princes of 7 lines and 3 dynasties; of which one was in power 7 times, 5 of them – 3 times, 8 of them – twice. Depending on the duration of rule: one – 13 years, one – 6 years, two – 5 years, 4 – 4 years, 3 – 3 years, 7 – 2 years and 36 – 1 year.[27][page needed]
Interpretations
[edit]How the 1169 Sack of Kiev is to be interpreted is a matter of scholarly and historiographical debate.[2] 'Many historians perceive it as a turning point in the history of Kievan Rus', although it may have had less material meaning than it was of symbolic signifance.[2] Yet, no other event has been given more weight by scholars to argue that the entire Kievan Rus' state was in the process of falling apart.[2] One frequently expressed interpretation regards the sack of Kiev as signalling the rise of Vladimir-Suzdal, as Andrey Bogolyubsky decided to keep Vladimir on the Klyazma as his residence, and appointed his younger brother Gleb (considered a "minor prince" by some) to govern the city of Kiev instead of taking the throne for himself.[2] He did not even lead his troops into battle, appointing his son Yury Bogolyubsky as commander, while he stayed behind in Suzdalia focusing on construction projects.[28] A common alternate interpretation sees Andrey recognising and confirming the centrality of Kiev, and restoring the dynastic order according to established practice by appointing Gleb as grand prince of Kiev because Gleb was already prince of Pereyaslavl, a traditional requirement for the Kievan throne.[17] Ukrainian historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1905) described the event as: "A whole cloud of princes of the Rus' moved to destroy Kyiv to the glory of its northern rival."[29]
Imperial Russian historian Vasily Klyuchevsky (died 1911) called the Suzdalian prince Andrei Bogolyubsky the first prince of the future Muscovites: "With Andrey Bogolyubsky, velikoros (the Great Russian) had entered the historical arena."[30] The chronicles call the Galician-Volyn prince Roman Mstislavych "the autocrat of all Rus'", while Andrey Bogolyubsky is called "the autocrat of the whole Suzdal land".[citation needed]
Russo-American historian George Vernadsky (1948) wrote: 'It was characteristic of Andrei that he did not go to Kiev after the seizure of the city by his troops but had the Kievan throne occupied by minor princes whom he treated as his vassals.'[31]
According to Soviet Russian historian B. A. Rybakov (1982), 'the description and degree of destruction in Kiev had been exaggerated by the chroniclers'.[2]
Jaroslaw Pelenski (1987) deduced that the primary justification for the Sack of Kiev provided in the Suzdal'–Vladimirian Chronicle was based on an earlier theological dispute concerning fasting on holy days which took place in Suzdal' in 1164.[20]
According to Lev Gumilev (1992), 'the Kiev pogrom testified to the loss of a sense of ethnic and state unity with Rus' among the population of Zalesye'.[32] In 1169, after capturing Kiev, Andrey gave the city for three days of looting and plundering to his soldiers. It was accepted to treat cities this way only when dealing with foreign settlements – until now. Such a practice has never spread to Rus' cities under any circumstances by that time. Andrey Bogolyubsky's order shows,' from Lev Gumilev's point of view, 'that for him and his army' (that is, Suzdalian, Chernigovian and Smolensk soldiers) 'Kiev in 1169 was as foreign as any German or Polish castle.[32]
American historian Janet Martin (2007) reasoned that Andrey was motivated by 'restoring the accepted dynastic order (...), not [by] a desire to tear that realm apart.'[31] All princes had recognised Rostislav of Smolensk 'as the rightful heir. Andrei, therefore, had no reason to intervene in Kievan politics until 1167, when Rostislav's nephew violated the collateral pattern of succession.'[31] Andrey chose Gleb as the new grand prince of Kiev simply because Gleb was already prince of Pereyaslavl, and thus next in line for the Kievan throne (after Rostislav's brother), confirming rather than disrupting established practice.[17]
Iryna Kostenko and Maryna Ostapenko (2022) wrote that Andrey sought to made Vladimir in Suzdalia "a second Kiev" by stealing the Icon of the Blessed Mother of God from Vyshhorod in 1155 (which would later become the most revered shrine of the Russian Empire). But without controlling the capital, he could not become a grand prince; therefore, in 1169, Andrey tried to destroy Kiev instead. "But not for long. Because from the ruins and ashes, the capital city of Kyiv unexpectedly rose again," and two years later defeated Andrey in the Siege of Vyshhorod (1171).[33]
Overview of princely branches of Kiev
[edit]
References
[edit]- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p Martin 2007, p. 124.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j Martin 2007, p. 125.
- ^ "850-річчя плюндрування Києва: перша українсько-російська війна чи князівська чвара?". Радіо Свобода (in Ukrainian).
- ^ a b c d e f g h Martin 2007, p. 123.
- ^ Костомаров, Н. И. (1872–1875). Андрей Боголюбский//Руская история в жизнеописаниях её главнейших деятелей.
- ^ a b Ostrowski 2012, p. 39.
- ^ a b c d Martin 2007, p. 119.
- ^ a b c Martin 2007, p. 117.
- ^ Fennell 2014, p. 10.
- ^ Martin 2007, p. 118.
- ^ Martin 2007, pp. 119–121.
- ^ a b c d e f Martin 2007, p. 121.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j Martin 2007, p. 122.
- ^ Martin 2007, pp. 121–122.
- ^ Martin 2007, pp. 122–123.
- ^ Martin 2007, pp. 123–124.
- ^ a b c d Martin 2007, pp. 126–127.
- ^ Pelenski 1987, p. 303.
- ^ a b c d e Pelenski 1987, p. 306.
- ^ a b Pelenski 1987, p. 307.
- ^ Pelenski 1987, p. 305.
- ^ Pelenski 1987, p. 304.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Martin 2007, p. 128.
- ^ Pelenski 1988, p. 776.
- ^ Мицик, Юрій. "Битва під Оршею 1514 року" (PDF). «Військово-історичний альманах» 2009, ч. 2 (19). Retrieved 22 March 2022.
- ^ a b Martin 2007, pp. 111–112.
- ^ Polonsʹka-Vasylenko, Natalii︠a︡. (1995). Istorii︠a︡ Ukraïny (3. vyd ed.). Kyïv: Lybidʹ. ISBN 5-325-00596-0.
- ^ Martin 2007, pp. 125–126.
- ^ Грушевський, Михайло. "Том II. Розділ III. Стор. 6. Історія України-Руси". litopys.org.ua.
- ^ Аристов, Вадим; Данилевский, И. (2017). Андрей Боголюбский. "Первый великоросс": [препринт] (in Russian).
- ^ a b c Martin 2007, p. 126.
- ^ a b Гумилев Л. Н. От Руси к России: очерки этнической истории.— М.: Экопрос, 1992.— С. 87.
- ^ "Вкрадена українська святиня й досі у Москві. Богородиця Володимирська чи Вишгородська?". Радіо Свобода (in Ukrainian).
Bibliography
[edit]- Martin, Janet (2007). Medieval Russia: 980–1584. Second Edition. E-book. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-511-36800-4.
- Fennell, John (13 October 2014). The Crisis of Medieval Russia 1200-1304. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-317-87314-3.
- Ostrowski, Donald (2012). "Systems of Succession in Rus' and Steppe Societies". Ruthenica. XI: 39–43.
- Pelenski, Jaroslaw (1987). "The Sack of Kiev of 1169: Its Significance for the Succession to Kievan Rus'". Harvard Ukrainian Studies. 11 (3). Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute: 303–316. JSTOR 41036277. Reprinted in Pelenski, The Contest for the Legacy of Kievan Rus'.
- Pelenski, Jaroslaw (1988). "The Contest for the "Kievan Succession" (1155–1175): The Religious-Ecclesiastical Dimension". Harvard Ukrainian Studies. 12/13: 761–780. JSTOR 41036344.