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The Military history WikiProject Newsletter : XLVII (January 2010)
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Nominations for the March 2010 Military history Project Coordinator elections now open!
The February 2010 issue of the Military history WikiProject newsletter has been published. You may read the newsletter, change the format in which future issues will be delivered to you, or unsubscribe from this notification by following the link. Thank you. This has been an automated delivery by BrownBot (talk) 22:30, 4 March 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Hi Harley, I have been fiddling with the article on David Beatty. In 'Our Admiral' by Charles Beatty the admirals nephew, the author states that He [Beatty] went back to sea on 2nd June 1902, five months short of his entitlement [to leave]. If this was not because he had become bored with the social round, following in Ethel's wake, it may have been because he was running short of money and was as yet reluctant to be dependent on her p.47 ch4. On the other hand, Roskill, admiral of the fleet earl Beatty, basically says that Beatty was not declared fit for sea duty until1 1902 and then immediately went to a new ship. This seems to be confirmed by his service record posted at http://www.admirals.org.uk/admirals/fleet/beattyd.php which shows him having regular medical assessments for 2 years which he repeatedly fails. (Beatty was injured in the arm at Tsientsin in 1900 and sent home, where he got married.)
I just wondered if you had been interested in this and might have a view which was correct. The Charles Beatty book is plainly an insiders account and has some 'interesting' perspectives on some things, but that doesnt necessarily mean he is wrong. In this case he seems to be talking quite definitively about available leave so I would think there must be some truth behind it. For example, if Beatty had been officially sick, would that mean he was still entitled to ordinary leave after being declared fit? It crossed my mind to wonder if Beatty might have been fiddling his medicals, which seem to have involved paralysis of his arm, since he seems to have been perfectly fit to go about ordinary activities such as hunting.10:08, 8 March 2010 (UTC)
Having an actual copy of Beatty's service record in front of me, I can attest that the version on the admirals.org.uk website is substantially correct. "MDG" is Medical Director-General of the Navy (at the time Sir Henry Frederick Norbury, M.D., K.C.B.). Therefore Beatty went back to sea only when he was allowed to. He did well to get a command in less than a month, succeeding Captain Henry Peter Routh in Juno (a man twenty years his senior).
Charles Beatty's book is interesting, but some of his assertions are wide of the mark (later in the book he insists that Beatty and Jellicoe were always friends). Otherwise it's an important accompaniment to Roskill and Chalmers' books, along with the Beatty Papers. It's interesting how Bryan Ranft refused to even acknowledge the allegation that Beatty was a !@#$%^&* in his Oxford Dictionary of National Biography article. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 12:47, 8 March 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks for getting back.
He quotes specific birth and marriage records which I presume are checkable, so its hard to see that this could be incorrect. It entirely makes sense of the odd comments by prospective biographers about how secretive the family was being. I havn't got anywhere near the end but it struck me as interesting that so far the 'good' and 'bad' characteristics he talks about for Beatty are somewhat different to the standard. I await with interest how the friendship with Jellicoe is to be carried forward through wwI. The book is a bit frustrating because it is a bit disorganised about specifics even when the info is present but scattered about the book. Any idea whether medical leave notwithstanding, Charles B. might have ben correct that DB could have taken extra leave if he had chosen to? I'm not entirely convinced why he would have so chosen, because 2 years away seems a very long time in any job you are serious about. There is another issue, that the article currently claims DB spent the two years as commander of Duke of Wellington in portsmouth harbour. I have left a note to neddyseagoon to ask where this came from? Sandpiper (talk) 19:16, 8 March 2010 (UTC)[reply]
There's no record of Beatty having ever commanded Duke of Wellington - it seems to have appeared in Webster's Dictionary. It's wrong anyway, as Captain John Leslie Burr commanded Duke of Wellington from 1901 to 1902. As a newly promoted Captain, as far as I can tell, Beatty couldn't be forced to retire for non-service for six years from the date of his promotion, though this was changed in 1903 to three years, by which point he had a command. It's entirely possible Beatty could have taken extra leave had he so chosen, but I can't see it as being very likely. Somewhere I've probably got the leave regulations. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 12:19, 9 March 2010 (UTC)[reply]
The March 2010 issue of the Military history WikiProject newsletter has been published. You may read the newsletter, change the format in which future issues will be delivered to you, or unsubscribe from this notification by following the link. Thank you. This has been an automated delivery by BrownBot (talk) 21:51, 7 April 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Thank you for uploading File:Ralph Paget.JPG. I noticed that the file's description page currently doesn't specify who created the content, so the copyright status is unclear. If you did not create this file yourself, you will need to specify the owner of the copyright. If you obtained it from a website, please add a link to the website from which it was taken, together with a brief restatement of that website's terms of use of its content. However, if the copyright holder is a party unaffiliated from the website's publisher, that copyright should also be acknowledged.
I'm working on this article and I noticed that you made a correction earlier saying that her turrets were numbered 1-7, although Hough says the day of the week and Burt calls them A, B, P, Q, X, Y, and Z. Do you have a source for your correction? I just noticed Burt's designations, which I'll have to add to the article, but I'd prefer to do all that once.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 02:40, 5 May 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Preston in Battleships of World War I p. 145 numbers the turrets. Also I have it on the authority of John Roberts that they were numbered 1 through 7. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 09:04, 5 May 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Curious that the RN wouldn't use the letter names that it had always used. I think I'll say that the days of the week were the unofficial names and add a note discussing the different official names once I get Preston out of storage.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 13:04, 5 May 2010 (UTC)[reply]
I imagine it was thought inconvenient to add another letter to the accepted A-B, P-Q, X-Y format. Somewhere in my correspondence I have a note that the days of the week was a Captain's nickname for the turrets - is it from Hough? --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 13:11, 5 May 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Do you have anything showing Agincourt's activities during the war? Hough is almost useless. I read through the official history and found very little other than one time when she was detached at Scapa during the Scandinavian convoy contretemps. I'll have to do another search re the Battle Squadrons she was assigned to, but I'll probably have to generalize her service to the major fleet sorties during the war.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 14:43, 5 May 2010 (UTC)[reply]
The only item of note I think is her participation in Operation ZZ, the internment of the High Sea Fleet, which is mentioned in Hough, and her transfer to the Second Battle Squadron just before the end of the war. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 17:45, 5 May 2010 (UTC)[reply]
The Military history WikiProject Newsletter : L (April 2010)
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Simon, I've been working on this for a few days now and wonder if you'd mind taking a look at it. There's still some legacy stuff that I need to clean out, but I'd appreciate some input on how much weight to retain on the whole designed for Fisher's Baltic Project aspect. Roberts and Burt generally discount that explanation, as you know, but I'm not sure how to address the other explanations used by them. Any other comments/corrections would be useful as well so don't limit yourself to that particular issue.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 20:59, 13 May 2010 (UTC)[reply]
As far as I can tell (from Fisher's own words) the Baltic Project was just an excuse to get the large light cruisers built. From the same source, Keith McBride in The Mariner's Mirror, there's absolutely nothing in the Ship's Covers which actually describe the intended use of Courageous and Glorious. I will have a look when I have a chance. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 15:24, 14 May 2010 (UTC)[reply]
The Military history WikiProject Newsletter : LI (May 2010)
The May 2010 issue of the Military history WikiProject newsletter has been published. You may read the newsletter, change the format in which future issues will be delivered to you, or unsubscribe from this notification by following the link. Thank you. This has been an automated delivery by BrownBot (talk) 21:11, 5 June 2010 (UTC)[reply]
'Q' Turret, Lion: thick front armour-plate pierced at junction with roof-plate (photograph taken after the plate had been removed and placed on deck)
Hi Simon, I've just been scanning and uploading to Commons from Burgess Warships To-day (1936). I thought you might find this photo, and the phrasing of its caption, of interest. (Yes, the naming typo is mine - two photos on the same page, I thought they were both Tiger at first.) Andy Dingley (talk) 14:10, 2 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks for that. It just so happens I've started working on an article on the turret explosion, which means digging out relevant photographs. I don't recall seeing this one before, but it certainly corresponds to a drawing in a damage report I have. Cheers, --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 14:44, 2 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
It was published in fighting at Jutland, Fawcett and Hooper. There is also a picture of a hole in lions deck and one of the funnel. The online version at internet archive is less abridged than the paper version I got. Sandpiper (talk) 22:16, 2 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Which brings me to why I was visiting. Just been reading 'the fleet that had to die' by Richard Hough about the russian fleet sent to Japan and defeated at Tsushima. Wondered if you had come across it and had an opinion. Its written as a novel, but that does not necessarily mean its fiction. Sandpiper (talk) 22:16, 2 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
I read it when I was eleven or twelve then lost the damned thing, which is a shame as it was a nice hardback edition. Considering that I last read it over a dozen years ago I'm not really in a position to judge, but knowing Hough's other work I can only guess that it's a relatively competent work crammed full of unfounded assertions on his part. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 22:56, 2 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
You really did start early. There is a contemporary account of the voyage too which I shall get round to, which I would expect Hough used as source material. But my main conclusion from the book would be to wonder how anyone could draw conclusions about naval tactics from the result of the battle since the russian crews seem to have been wholly incompetent, operating in impossible conditions and verging on the mutinous. There is one line towards the beginning where at a banquet to send off the fleet one of the captains gets up and says 'every penny spent on the russian fleet has been wasted and we are all going to die'. Dont know if its historically accurate, which is a great shame because it seems to sum up the situation precisely (credited to captain bukhvostoff of alexander III).Sandpiper (talk) 07:48, 3 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
another question which you might know the answer to. Where was/is room 40? Patrick beesley says 'it was a room on the first floor of the old building, in the same corridor as the admiralty board room and the first sea lord's office...it was 24 feet by seventeen...it looked out on an inner courtyard.' It starts to be confusing with a foot note saying fisher moved his office to the west building, but mostly, having looked at wiki on the admiralty buildings, 'old building' is a relative term and now seems to be applied to what in 1914 was a rather new building. So i wondered whether you might have a better idea of the layout so as to show where it is. I was thinking we needed a picture at least of the outside of the correct building. Sandpiper (talk) 18:56, 6 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
It was indeed down the corridor from the Board Room (Room 36), on the first floor of the Old Building (now called the Ripley Building). Quite a way down the corridor, it has to be said. The Board Room, and consequently Room 42A (the First Sea Lord's office) were at the Southern end, Room 40 was at the Northern end. God knows what Beesley's on about Fisher changing office, as the First Sea Lord had his office on that same corridor all through the war, although it may have confused the poor chap that Room 42A was counted as part of the West building (later renamed Block I during the war). Old Building may have been a relative term, but the structure was still nearly two hundred years old by the time Fisher became First Sea Lord again.
I was actually in the Admiralty last Tuesday, courtesy of a man at the Cabinet Office. Unfortunately all the rooms have been renumbered, and I didn't have my floor plan and couldn't remember the room sequence. I did wander down the corridor in hope of a miracle (door magically swinging open &c.), but in vain. I doubt you'll find many decent pictures of the Old Admiralty Building as there's a very large masonry screen and archway separating it from Whitehall, and I can attest that all a digital camera can encompass from inside the courtyard is the portico. I also got some very nice photos of the Board Room (including myself sat at the head of the Board Table, trampling on the memory of Eric Geddes), but unfortunately all kinds of paperwork are apparently required before I can "release" them. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 19:54, 6 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Theres a 1794 plan here (first pic) but I guess its the downstairs layout? I gather the boardroom is at the back of the building, originally overlooking St James park, but now a quadrangle formed by the extension along the side of horseguards. Would room 40 be on the same side and therefore also be looking into this same quadrangle (being what beesley means)? Google earth has a satellite view of the building (the 2005/6 view is better with less marked shadowing). It looks to me as though the old building may have become one side of the quadrangle, but have been joined up with a new section on the north end. It may be that the corridor now extends into a newer section than that shown on the wiki drawing? Would this mean in fact the north end of this corridor is outside the original ripley building? What I meant by old being relative, is that the wiki article seems to describe the extension behind the ripley building as the 'old admiralty building', eg (second pic). If this is correct, when did the new building become the old building? IS it possible some of these refeences to room 40 OB actually mean the new section which had by then been re-designated as the old building? Which could still be consistent with room 40 being on the extended north end of the main corridor, actually in a new bit rather than Ripleys building? So Im confused. Sandpiper (talk) 21:04, 6 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
And one more pic of the boardroom if this looks familiar
Beesley also says 'In addition to room 40 ID25 probably also occupied rooms 41,42,43 and 44 and certainly occupied rooms 45 to 56. The numbering of the rooms has been changed more than once since 1919. The original room 40 can still be positively identified. Rooms 45 to 56 would appear to have been those on both sides of the first floor of the northern one of two wings which run out from the main entrance of the admiralty to Whitehall'. Again, it is hard to be completely certain what he means, but I imagine a central staircase near the entrance from whitehall with then corridors running north and south on the first floor. The difficulty with this simple interpretation being that probably the buildings have been knocked about over the years so that from the inside the newer parts join on invisibly to the older ones. So from the inside,the northern wing starting at the whitehall entrance might meander seamlessly into the new buildings beside or behind the ripley one. Sandpiper (talk) 23:34, 6 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Apologies for the delay, the after-effects of the 'flu and a persistent toothache have taken their toll on me. In answer to your questions, yes Room 40 did overlook the quadrangle formed with the new buildings. The corridor which it is on was and is part of the Old Admiralty/Ripley Building. There is no main staircase, but there are small staircases at each end of the corridor. Rooms 40 to 56 would have taken up the whole north wing of the Old Admiralty/Ripley Building (with the exception of Room 57) and the western stretch of the corridor including and above Room 40. Presumably that corridor did continue into the North Block (renamed from Block II in 1917) of the Admiralty extension (what the F.C.O. foolishly calls the Old Admiralty Building), but since the rooms were numbered in a different sequence in each block/section, it would have been a noticeable change. It was behind a locked door when I visited so I wouldn't know. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 15:15, 9 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
There was a sign on it sayng it was locked so you could tell? Anyway, I think the best we can do would be a pic of the front of the building saying room 40 was in the northern end. There are several old drawings of the building but I have yet to find a good modern one which gets any kind of sensible view over Mr Adams screen. Do you think their lordships were feeling vulnerable when they ordered it? Does the actual boardroom look west over the courtyard? (sorry about your local difficulties)Sandpiper (talk) 21:55, 9 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
got another point for you (never rains but it pours). You changed the mention of cable ship 'telconia' to 'alert', in the article. Do you know whether telconia did do anything, or how the impression arose it was telconia? Sandpiper (talk) 12:31, 21 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
The author of the article in question, whose name I have already forgotten, puts it down to Barbara Tuchman putting Telconia in The Zimmerman Telegram. It's one of those books from the dark age of history, but Tuchman's so respected no-one bothered to follow up on her "research." The author of the article went through the records of the G.P.O., who owned the cable ships, and found the report of the man who headed the operation and cut all the cables. Maybe Telconia was the ship alluded to which cut cables later? --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 15:23, 21 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
You will gather ive started reading beesly room 40. Its quite a dense book and I havnt got very far what with going backwards and forwards to reorganise information, so he may yet have more to say. What I am wondering is to what extent these intelligence mixups, such as misreporting of Scheer's being still in harbour, might have been deliberate in order to mislead German listeners about british intelligence. It seem entirely in keeping with how these people were thinking and their paranoia about keeping their capabilities secret that they would send out deliberately incorrect messages to mislead the germans, when they thought they could. It seems plain the German were expecting the British to be listening for Scheers call sign, and took steps to disguise his leaving port. What more natural than if the british noticed this deception, to pretend to have been fooled by sending a message of their own likely to be intercepted? I think I read somewhere where this story about jackson originated, but I now forget. But the arguments about it must have been going on at a time the british establishment was still trying to keep room 40 secret, or the extent of its operation secret, so blaming jackson might just have been the preferable cover. Sandpiper (talk) 08:56, 13 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
The key problem with the Jackson story is that it is just that, a story, which appeared in W. F. Clarke's unpublished autobiographical notes and a semi-official unpublished history of Room 40 after the war (which Clarke co-wrote). Hines makes clear that Clarke's accusations are unfounded, and looking through the Jutland material in The National Archives a couple of weeks ago I found nothing to substantiate them either, or any evidence that Jackson was made a scapegoat.
Hines does argue that a limited amount of deception to disguise knowledge of German codes was involved, but this was at the Admiralty level when disseminating SIGINT to the operational level, and Jackson would have been privy to this. Once again, any historian should bear in mind that Clarke's accusation against Jackson isn't borne out by other witnesses, the record, or Jackson's subsequent career. It wasn't until the '50s I believe when the story surfaced, first told by John Irving, father of the notorious David Irving. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 12:02, 16 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Im puzzled in what context Irving (sr) first told the story, given you say it originates with Clarke, though I note Irving was a WW2 naval officer. Beesly is quoting Clarke, where he says the only times Jackson had visited room 40 was firstly to complain about cutting his hand on a box containing intercepts, and another time to express his pleasure when due to a code change he stopped getting messages. On the whole Beeslys book is mildly disorganised but seems to hang together thematically and plot wise. Which i suppose makes sense if a codebreaker is creating a work of fiction, but presuming it to be fact it seems a coherent picture. To what extent he really had inside knowledge and to what extent he was spinning the reminiscences of senile old men, I cant say. I havnt assimilated the book well enough to be clear to what extent the director of operations was in the loop of decoded information. If he was actually getting sensible intelligence reports, which plainly existed at the time of Jutland, his comment about being pleased the messages had stopped is simply insane. No one even half sensible in the job could say something like that if fully informed of the information they were getting.
Beesly basically seems to be saying that at least pre-Jutland dissemination of room 40 information to any other department and any person except Oliver and the first sea lord was non existant. Hall as director of intelligence seems to have been inside the loop, but there is at least one statement in the book early on saying Churchill left the Director of operations off the list of people seeing information. Elsewhere he seems to be getting information, but its not clear to me exactly what. I am still reading and have a little flag up in by head to sort out this point. It is entirely clear from what beesly says that the intellignece department apart from Hall and his immediate assistants was proceeding wholly in ignorance of room 40. The picture he paints is one of only those at the very top (basically Oliver, or I suppose Hall, Arthur Wilson and current 1st sea lord) having both sources of information to compare and intervening based on room 40s information only when they saw fit. Somewhere it says the 2nd sea lord knew about room 40, but also the comments at the time of Fishers resignation show he was not well informed at that time.
But to get back to Jackson, I cant really imagine anyone going off to a secret location to complain about sharp boxes. As an excuse to drop in and poke about and as something to say, yes, but even if that is the case, it sounds like someone wholly ignorant of what was happening in room 40. And again, dropping in and commenting that messages have stopped makes sense if you are curious what is going on, but it seems to me more a complaint he keeps being sent rubbish, than the clearly useful information room 40 was producing. So on my reading of the book so far, beesly is saying the director of operations didnt have a clue what was really going on in room 40 and was not generally allowed access to information important to him in carrying out his job.
Beesly states the original of the message to jellicoe mentioning scheer being in port was hand written by Oliver. So Oliver clearly agreed with it. While I can accept Jackson being ignoramt of actual information coming from room 40, I cannot accept that Oliver was. While he was grossly overworked, he must have by this point got a pretty good idea of how German operations were carried out. Beesly stresses that the Germans had a system, and every single time ships sailed, it all went down the same. Their difficulty was in determining what the German ships intended once they left port, never in when they were planning to do so.
If jackson never normally visited room 40, his presence at this moment is something of a mystery. Beesly observes that in point of fact the Germans changed some of their ciphers immediately before the Jutland operation and this caused some delay in Room 40s ability to decode. he seems to be saying that the specific message transferring the Dk call sign to the harbour was made around 5 pm on 30 may, but this was not decoded until the afternoon of 31 may. Presumably there would have been a bit of a flap in room 40 as they worked on breaking the code asap in the middle of a german operation. If Oliver was expecting such a message to be passed to him (as a matter of German routine), this might explain why jackson would be despatched to room 40 to ask about what was happening. His going there on such a specific mission seems rather odd without a specific explanation. So scenario would be, Oliver is puzzled, sends jackson to check, jackson gets a mixed up message. If Jackson didnt properly understand the meaning of the question he was asking, no surprise he didnt ask it properly. As I said, Room 40 seems to have been very good at determiming exactly when German ships planned to leave port, but their difficulty was with what they intended thereafter, and also with last minute changes, which were quite frequent. If Oliver composed the actual message to jellicoe, then in the end it was Olivers situation assessment which was sent out. Beesly accuses him of overcentralisation and attempting to do far more than one man could, but not of incompetence. Would Jackson be in full possession of the available facts or merely be used literally as a messenger boy despite his nominal high position? Sandpiper (talk) 20:16, 17 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
I will get back to you on this, and I apologise for the delay, but I'm catching up on things after being unwell and had a surprise commission for an article in a journal the other day which is nice but time-consuming. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 10:47, 21 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
theres a curious little quote in William James' biography of Oliver. All very jolly hockey sticks, however about Jutland he says:
Oliver and his staff had been busy for about 30 hours before the battle and he found the constant visits of the first lord and other important people to the chart room very trying.[james] James now makes a quotation, presumably from Oliver, Balfour stayed in my office chatting all afternoon and some of the evening and his naval assistant and his private secretary also, and if I went to look at a chart some of them were bound to be in the way and all the talk was distracting. When I could stand it no longer I went to Balfour and shook his hand and said 'Good night sir', and he said goodnight and took his supporters away with him. It was nice of him not to be offended.
So is Oliver saying he couldn't concentrate on the ongoing battle because Balfour was bugging him all the time it was on? That might sound as though the message about scheer was sent before the first lord arrived, but equally after they had been up for 24 hours? Sandpiper (talk) 22:31, 29 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
I'm not a fan of "Bubbles", which is one reason I've never bothered buying his biography of Oliver. Not that it matters, as on Thursday I'm copying Oliver's typescript memoirs in toto at the National Maritime Museum. I'm spending all of Wednesday at The National Archives and among other things I intend to copy every Room 40 logbook connected with Jutland possible. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 06:25, 30 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
I know theres some kind of memoir, but I dont know how extensive it is? If I get round to it, some Bubbles career development will be popping up in Dummies article eventually. There is a chance I shall be in central London thursday afternoon....tempting. (just when you actually want one of those smiley icon things, they dont do them) Sandpiper (talk) 18:35, 30 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Hi Simon, I've got a question for you. Do you know if the RN added a stabilizer to their cordite after Jutland, or were they unaware of that aspect of the problem? What I'm getting at is whether unstable propellant played a role in Hood's loss (German RPC generally burned while cordite tended to flash). Any ideas? Parsecboy (talk) 20:49, 15 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
I've had a quick look at my sources. In 1917 the source of the nitro-cellulose was changed from cotton-waste to clean carded cotton silver. Apparently chalk was added as a stabiliser, and cracked petroleum jelly to increase the quantity of unsaturated hydrocarbons: this was Cordite MC, but I've no idea when it was first introduced - Campbell, Brown, McCallum et al. aren't exactly exhaustive in their accounts of Cordite. It was superseded by Cordite SC in 1927, which had a very different chemical composition to that used in Cordite MC and its predecessors. I see that in his Warship International article back in '87 Bill Jurens speculated that Hood might not have been lost had she been carrying single-base instead of double-base propellants (as in U.S.N. practice). I can't remember whether he's reconsidered his views since then, and I'm loath to check my book on the Hood and Bismarck dive documentary, which he was the technical consultant (producers have a habit of twisting technical realities to suit their own prejudices). I may drop him a line and see if he has anything to add. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 06:29, 16 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks for your help. I tracked down Bill Juren's article (it's available online here, though there are a few clicks before you get the article) and it was a rather interesting read. I'm curious to hear if he has modified his conclusion since 1987. Thanks again. Parsecboy (talk) 12:52, 16 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
The reference to the new source of nitro-cellulouse (as well as making the nitrating time at least 2½ hours) from April 1917 is found in "Technical Topics No5." Warship Volume II. p. 139. The reference to Cordite MC containing chalk as a stabiliser and cracked petroleum jelly is on the same page. Cordite SC's composition of 41% Nitroglycerin, 50% Nitro-cellulose, 9% Diethyl Diphenyl Urea, is from p. 140. On the same page, comparing Cordite MD to Cordite SC, Campbell writes that they were of "rather different composition." --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 09:26, 21 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
I suppose really with Warship it's a chapter (just so you know). Pages are 138-140. The ISBN is 0-85177-149-1. Incidentally, I did look in the Hood and Bismarck dive documentary book, and in the pages devoted to Bill Jurens's opinion on the loss of Hood cordite instability, or even cordite, isn't mentioned. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 12:30, 24 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Simon, I'm in the final stages of finishing up the article on this ship and thought you might like a chance to look it over since I've incorporated some of your text. Could you check in Marder to see what she did in 1918 as I can't confirm anything from Newbolt? Still need to work a bit on the post-war career, but not much else remains to be done, other than general tidying, I think.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 06:09, 17 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
I will have a look see at the article. Marder mentions nothing specific, and as I think I've mentioned somewhere before when referring to the sortie of the Grand Fleet in response to the High Sea Fleet on 24 April, there is only the unhelpful reference to "4 battle cruisers," which is a very low figure. Hayward's book, HMS Tiger at Bay would no doubt be useful, but it's been years since I consulted a copy. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 09:21, 19 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
The Military history WikiProject Newsletter : LIII (July 2010)
On the subject of the class name, you mentioned on the talk page looking in the Times; do you have access to the Times online archive? I found some references to "royal sovereign class" (about 13) searching between 1910 and 1920; at least half of them are for this RS class, and the earliest is march 1914 (10.3.14 p10 Commons report). There were none at all for "revenge class" (well one referrring to "revenge or class hatred..."; not really useful...) I can give you some refs if you need them. Xyl 54 (talk) 14:59, 21 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
The Commons reference is a Member of Parliament using the RS designation in a question to Churchill. I see the Germans in their statement on the Skagerrak battle apparently called it the RS class. The other references I can only assume are down to The Times's naval correspondent, Thursfield. I suspect the idea of people referring to the Royal Sovereign class is a reference, unconscious or otherwise, to the original class (afterall, the Revenge class was supposed to number eight ships). --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 15:18, 21 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
BTW, your reply, above; are you suggesting that none of those references count for anything? That the people making them were mistaken, or didn't know what they were talking about? I'm not clear that I follow you. Xyl 54 (talk) 10:54, 26 August 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Many thanks for taking the trouble to remove the mass of confusing and irrelevant material around World War I in the Mediterranean Fleet article. It is much clearer now Dormskirk (talk) 08:35, 4 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]
It is, isn't it. You'll never get a proper list of all the flag command in the Mediterranean in First World War from published sources or the internet. The only place such details exist is at The National Archives in the Service Records or the list of Squadrons in ADM 6/461. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 08:52, 4 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]
The Military history WikiProject Newsletter : LIV (August 2010)
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I've been trying to improve this page for some time, to accurately list the titles of the Flag Officers involved. Now I've just discovered you, you are probably the best person to advise how this one should develop. Would you please indicate which are the greatest inaccuracies there at the moment, for a start, so I can fix them? Maybe you can give me some suggestions for research sources too; I'd like to nail down the list of Flag Officers 1945-1990 for a start. Kind regards Buckshot06(talk)09:02, 29 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]
I'd hardly say I'm the best person. For another website, I've spent the best part of months of trying to work out how to lay out the various fleet command of the Royal Navy from 1889 to 1919 (my area of expertise) and it's an absolute nightmare. For example, you have the Atlantic Fleet, created in 1905. From 1905 to 1910 it was under a Commander-in-Chief, and from 1910 to 1912 it was under a Vice-Admiral Commanding, before it became the Third Battle Squadron. In 1919 it was reformed from the Grand Fleet under a Commander-in-Chief, who for part of that year held the title of Commander-in-Chief Atlantic and Home Fleets, before the Home Fleet became the Reserve Fleet and a totally separate command. The Atlantic Fleet remained under a Commander-in-Chief until 1932, when it was renamed the Home Fleet. And that's an easy one. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 11:01, 29 September 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Well thanks for that example - I've inserted it into the Atlantic Fleet entry and it improves it enormously. What is the other website? I'd like to take a look. Also, maybe you could advise me on something else. Did Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson command the Channel Squadron or Channel Fleet 1901-03? What were the appointments of the Commander-in-Chief, Channel Fleet's subordinate seagonig admirals? Thanks again, Buckshot06(talk)20:41, 4 October 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Wilson was officially "Senior Officer in Command of the Channel Squadron" from 1901 to 1903. His subordinate flag officer in that squadron was the Second-in-Command, who commanded a division of battleships. The date of the change in title from Home Fleet to Channel Fleet is uncertain - sources say it was either 14 December, 1904 or 1 January, 1905. At any rate, in the Channel Fleet, 1905-1907, the subordinate flag officers were the Second-in-Command, and a Rear-Admiral. This arrangement continued until the absorption of the Channel Fleet into the Home Fleet in 1909. Off the top of my head each of the three flag officers would have commanded a division of battleships. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 21:27, 4 October 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Nice old topic to return to. I've just had a look through my files. Turns out that in January I found and copied the actual letter sent from the Admiralty to Admiral Wilson informing him of the changes, i.e. Home Fleet → Channel Fleet, Channel Fleet → Atlantic Fleet. Dated 14 December, it states "These changes are to come into force forthwith." The reference to a pre-change Channel Fleet is irritating - it means I'm going to have to go through the Channel Fleet papers and the Beresford service records to try and establish when the Channel Squadron became the Channel Fleet, before of course it became the Atlantic Fleet. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 07:09, 17 August 2011 (UTC)[reply]
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I've got nothing to add, really. Is the author's name Schenia or Scheina? Burt's use of the term "range clock" isn't strictly accurate, as range clock applies to a fire control device. Maybe "concentration clock" or "range dial" would suffice? I can't see the point of this sentence:
"The varied attempts by the British to sell their excess naval armament led the United States' New York Times to remark that "all information at hand indicates that the [Royal Navy] has decided to sell all battleships and battlecruisers ... that carry main batteries of less than 15-inch caliber.""
It's common knowledge that all British 12-inch gunned ships were paid off after the war, but to say they wanted to sell all their 13.5-inch gunned ships is just idle speculation and plain wrong. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 15:03, 3 November 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Alright, thanks. I've been misspelling his name...
Well heck Simon I don't know many historical studies that are not flawed. Trying to get information on US base propellant powders wasn't easy and I was pretty certain that cordite was at the root cause of the BC losses by the British. I never knew about the US Navy's ordinance testing of cordite till I saw this. I'd sure like to look at the primary records and I wonder if the test results are in the National Archive. I've seen the book that lists out every hit in Jutland and the results but I haven't seen it since or even recall its name now, but the other area for me that was a bit enlightening was that only 17.6% of shell hits by the Brits actually performed correctly. That is comparable to the US Navy sending its submarines out in WW2 with MK14 torpedoes, they were also very humane... The part where the Germans were putting shells back together from fractured pieces was startling if true. I'll root out Massie's book and see if I can find that section today.Tirronan (talk) 15:33, 27 December 2010 (UTC)[reply]
What do you mean by "Trying to get information on US base propellant powders wasn't easy and I was pretty certain that cordite was at the root cause of the BC losses by the British."? You were trying to get information on US propellants?
I just cannot take Ott's silly mistakes seriously. He claims the Lions had 6-inch armour before correcting himself later that they had 9-inch belts. He claims that German charges were cased, which is just wrong - the main charge was in a casing and the fore charge was in a silk bag, something which is stated in most sources he references. There are many more errors if you want them. And as Campbell makes clear, it's difficult to work out the effectiveness of German shell on British armour above 9-inch when there was only one possible (a key word Ott ignores) hit on Barham's heavy armour. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 16:49, 27 December 2010 (UTC)[reply]
I don't intend on getting into a pissing match or anything here. Yes I made a mistake with regards to the Lion's belt armor on the first mention of it, but it was corrected later. Sue me - it's not as though I'm the first person to screw up typing something. As for the propellants, I very clearly stated "The Germans stored their main propellant charges in large brass cartridges equipped with protective metal covers. Smaller fore charges were kept in silk bags and stored in metal cases." at the bottom of page 29. Parsecboy (talk) 18:09, 27 December 2010 (UTC)[reply]
I'm not all that easy to rile obviously, but I still found value in it. I've always thought it was the cordite was part of the reason and Buord didn't think much of it either. I've included a link to what I found in the Jutland talk page.Tirronan (talk) 22:20, 30 December 2010 (UTC)[reply]
I got bogged down in Original Research after much digging in the British Library and the British National Archives. A Wikipedia article or series of articles just wouldn't do justice to the subject, plus my intention has always been to write a proper biography for publication someday. A law degree has slowed things down somewhat, however. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 12:38, 31 December 2010 (UTC)[reply]
Hello, Simon Harley! WikiProject United States, an outreach effort supporting development of United States related articles in Wikipedia, has recently been restarted after a long period of inactivity. As a user who has shown an interest in United States related topics we wanted to invite you to join us in developing content relating to the United States. If you are interested please add your Username and area of interest to the members page here. Thank you!!!
Simon, I came across your name on the British military history taskforce list. I need some independent advice on the following.
As copy editor I cleaned up an article on abortive WWI trials of Turkish 'war criminals' or Malta Exiles. In editing the article, I noticed that —
its previous discussion history had been a less than amicable exchange between what I take to be Turkish and Armenian partisans in a dispute about whether a genocide took place;
the article itself obviously needs some TLC from a person with an interest and access to reliable references;
the article appears to be orphaned, but might be a suitable expansion on matters raised in the Malta Exiles article (I say orphaned because very few people are likely to search for 'inter-allied tribunal' when actually looking for post-WWI political settlements); and
in my opinion, throwing these questions back directly at the Turkish Portal without considering first the best available options is likely to re-ignite a currently dormant Turkish/Armenian animus.
I therefore thought I'd seek advice on where someone with an interest in that period of history thinks the article might actually belong.
Just wondered if you had any suggestions on material to read on cruisers, 1860-1910. Our coverage of armoured cruiser and protected cruiser is poor and I am trying to work on it from time to time. In particular I'm interested in, and a bit stuck with, the RN's decision to continue using the deck-only protection scheme during the 1890s and the eventual transition to the "light cruiser". Thanks in advance... The Land (talk) 18:51, 3 April 2011 (UTC)[reply]
As with most of these things, there seems to be a lot we still don't know about. While Roger Parkinson bangs on a bit too much about battleships getting all the attention as being the standard of naval power, I think it's true to say that the history and therefore the significance of the Royal Navy's many cruiser programmes has been neglected. For my part, I've been re-reading D. K. Brown's Warrior to Dreadnought and Parkinson's material on cruisers, and whatever I can glean from the work of Sumida and Nicholas Lambert. I probably should dig out Marder's Anatomy of British Sea Power at some point, as he, like Parkes, seemed to have looked at stuff which has either been lost or which nobody else has found. All I can suggest is keep on reading until you get a fairly good idea of the era and the answer to your question regarding the continued use of the protective deck may well pop-up. No answer's coming to my mind off-hand, but it might after I have a trawl through my sources. I will keep you posted. I'm getting bored with my usual hobby of mapping the Royal Navy's flag list, anyway. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 12:25, 4 April 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Having had a quick think about it, referring to McBride's article on the Diadem class from Warship No. 44, the answer may well lie in Manning's life of Sir William White, who was a strong proponent of the protective deck system, and in D. K. B.'s A Century of Naval Construction. Both of these are on my "shopping list" next time I get to Greenwich. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 12:37, 4 April 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Glad I found out as I was intending to get the book, not least for coverage of the early cruisers which are not well documented. That's odd because Friedman's book on the early British destroyers is pretty good once you get used to his peccadillos and pretty complete from what I can judge. There's coverage of the Powerful class in Preston's World's Worst Warships, but only scattered references in Warship, Warship International and Warships for Export on Armstrong-built ships.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 15:19, 4 April 2011 (UTC)[reply]
The destroyer book is a good technical overview, but it's fairly useless on operational details: How they were meant to be used is just as important as what they were capable of. His background knowledge of the Admiralty is pretty atrocious. I only hope he improved it for the cruiser book. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 15:55, 4 April 2011 (UTC)[reply]
A faint hope, I suspect. Pity that DKN never got into type histories for the British like Friedman did for the Americans, although his overviews are very nice. More detail would have been very welcome. Friedman never seems to get much involved in doctrinal issues, even when they drove the requirements that ultimately produced the ships. One of his more annoying issues, I must say.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 16:23, 4 April 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Unfortunately, the man is a machine: He pumps books out like other people write articles. When I was at The National Archives in January I came across one of his request slips in a Grand Fleet record book from 2006 (which he'd evidently misplaced). To have systematically gone through that book alone would have taken weeks or even months - I'm still going through it now, and I copied every one of its 1,000 pages!
Unfortunately (again) I only started properly reading Warrior to Dreadnought after Brown died, which is a shame as I corresponded with him every so often on Grand Fleet matters. I'm fairly sure he would have had answers to many of the questions I now have regarding the pre-dreadnought era. C'est la vie. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 17:58, 4 April 2011 (UTC)[reply]
I can't offhand confirm he was the first captain, as most capital ships had captains appointed for trials. I will have a look. His dates of appointment and being relieved I can do, however. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 07:06, 8 April 2011 (UTC)[reply]
Be advised that I have taken this to the Wikipedia:Fringe theories/Noticeboard and that your name has been brought up. We need to get some folks involved here regretfully.Tirronan (talk) 01:54, 13 May 2011 (UTC)[reply]
After a bit of research, I've given warning that the section in question will be removed, if reliable source citations can not be provided within seven days under Wikipedia:UNDUE which seems to cover this case verbatim.Tirronan (talk) 04:05, 15 May 2011 (UTC)[reply]
I'm shocked you have patience to deal with him. I already have a rock-bottom opinion of Hall, but I can't quite believe that he would have been as stupid as von Rintelen claims. --Simon Harley (Talk | Library). 16:30, 17 May 2011 (UTC)[reply]
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